Monthly Legal Costs Update – April 2026
Here, in Kain Knight Costs Lawyers’ regular monthly legal costs update, we focus on those cases which we believe are likely to have a practical relevance for its members. We welcome feedback and if there is an area, topic or case you would like us to address, please let us know.
This April 2026 update has been written by Nick McDonnell and Colin Campbell.
This month we have what might be the final word, subject to a second appeal, on the vexed issue of providing a breakdown of fees where an agency has been involved in the provision of a service, here the use of an interpreter.
Conflicting decisions have been circulating for years at costs judge, regional costs judge and district judge level, but in in Motor Insurers’ Bureau v Santiago [2026] EWHC 513 (KB), Moody J has hopefully drawn a judicial line at High Court level. Below, HHJ Dight had assessed the recoverable figure to be £794.40 as opposed to the claimed sum of £924. The defendant argued that in the absence of a breakdown, the court should assess the fee at nil because the £924 included an undisclosed agency element and the interpreter’s fee would have been less had his instruction been concluded directly with him. That argument failed.
Moody J held that there is no rule of law or practice that requires a breakdown in every case where a litigation service is provided through a company. The court’s task is to assess reasonableness and proportionality. There had been no error by HHJ Dight in reaching his decision to allow £794.40 without a breakdown, so the appeal was dismissed.
Turning next to two cases on security for costs under CPR 25.
In Harrington & Charles Trading Co Ltd (In Liquidation) v Mehta [2026] EWHC 387 (Ch) – 19 Joanna Smith J decided who should pay the costs of an application for security for costs which had been resolved before the return date for the application. It was the defendants’ case that they now had the benefit of a satisfactory ATE Policy with cover for some £13 million which they did not have before they issued the application, and should have the costs. The claimants argued that the application had been issued prematurely.
Joanna Smith J held that the court needed to be alive to the fact that parties compromised applications for many different reasons, sometimes pragmatic and commercial, and that they should be encouraged to do so rather than be penalised for doing so. It was not the role of the court to make predictions about what the outcome would have been if the application had been argued. No order as to costs was the appropriate order.
The second case is Soprim Construction Sarl v Djibouti [2026] EWHC 418 (Comm).
The case has a lengthy and complicated history which is too complex to recite here. In short, Soprim obtained an arbitration award worth ultimately $135m which it sought to enforce against the Republic of Djibouti via cash held in UK banks. A third party company objected to the enforcement on the basis that the cash belonged to the company and not to the republic. It then sought security for costs against Soprim and failed. Waksman J held that under CPR 25.26, security for costs can only be ordered in favour of a defendant to a claim, and since the company was merely an objector to the enforcement proceedings, no order could be made.
Next a Court of Appeal decision about the validity of a bill of costs for detailed assessment under CPR 47.6.
In Duffy v Birmingham City Council [2026] EWCA Civ 146, the solicitor had not expressly certified that “the costs claimed do not exceed the costs which the receiving party is liable to pay to me/my firm”, that is to say, that the bill complied with the indemnity principle. LJsd Newey, Phillips and Nugee held that there was no justification for treating a breach of that requirement as fatal to the validity of the bill any more than any other breach. The signature on the bill constituted implicit certification and the omission might be seen as a less serious error than many others. The bill was valid and effective to commence a detailed assessment and the claimant was entitled to a default costs certificate following the failure of the losing party to serve points of dispute.
Still in the Court of Appeal, in Attersley v UK Insurance Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 217, Lewison, Falk and Miles LJs reversed the decision below by Mrs Justice Stacey (see [2025] Costs LR 615). In proceedings in a claim for damages for personal injury following a road traffic accident, the issue was whether the claimant was limited to fixed costs, or entitled to costs assessed on the standard basis, up to the point of the expiry of the relevant period for acceptance of a Part 36 offer that she had subsequently accepted late.
Her claim had been commenced under the Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents (£1,000–£25,000) (“the RTA Protocol”). At the defendant’s request the claim had exited the RTA Protocol since liability was in dispute. In subsequent proceedings under CPR Part 7, the defendant had made a Part 36 offer of £45,000, before allocation to a track. The claim had subsequently been allocated to the multi-track: after that, the claimant had belatedly accepted the Part 36 offer. It was the defendant’s case that the claimant was only entitled to her fixed costs up to that date, pursuant to CPR 36.20, as then in force.
Below, the judge had held that the claimant was entitled to her reasonable costs on the standard basis up to the expiry of the Part 36 offer in accordance with CPR 45.29 then in force. That decision had been wrong.
Where a claim started under the Protocol and was later allocated to the multitrack due to late acceptance of an offer, the costs were governed by CPR 36.20. As such, the claimant was entitled only to the fixed costs. CPR 36.20 required the application of the fixed costs rules in Part 45 applicable on the date on which the relevant period expired in any case which had not, by that date, already been allocated to the multi-track. Appeal allowed.
Finally, as we await the judgment in Mazur which was heard by the Court of Appeal over three days about who is authorised to conduct litigation, we have another decision about who is not.
In XX v GH [2026] EWFC 53(B), a very experienced legal executive without Independent Practice Rights granted by CILEx Regulation, applied for the permission for the court to conduct litigation in a family matter involving financial remedy proceedings, work she had been doing for many years. HHJ Farquhar refused the application, holding that there was a route which could be followed to obtain authorisation and it was not for the Court to provide a short cut remedy to permit the person applying to conduct litigation prior to being authorised by her Professional Body.
As always, these are a selection of the principal recent cases which are likely to be of use to practitioners and if any further information is required, please contact either Nick McDonnell or Colin Campbell at Nick.McDonnell@kain-knight.co.uk or Colin.Campbell@kain-knight.co.uk
