Costs Case Law Update – March 2026
Welcome to the Kain Knight Case Law Update for March 2026, written by Colin Campbell.
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Motor Insurers’ Bureau v Santiago [2026] EWHC 513 (KB) – 19 February – Moody J dealt with an interpreter’s fee
Below, HHJ Dight had assessed the recoverable figure at £794.40 as opposed to the claimed sum of £924. The defendant argued that in the absence of a breakdown, the court should assess the fee at nil because the £924 included an undisclosed agency element and the interpreter’s fee would have been less had his instruction been concluded directly with him.
Dismissing the appeal, Moody J held that there is no rule of law or practice that requires a breakdown in every case where a litigation service is provided through a company. The court’s task is to assess reasonableness and proportionality. There had been no error by HHJ Dight in reaching his decision to allow £794.40 without a breakdown. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
The judgment can be found by clicking here.
Soprim Construction Sarl v Djibouti [2026] EWHC 418 (Comm) – 27 February – Waksman J
In a dispute with a long and complex history, Soprim obtained an arbitration award worth ultimately $135m which it sought to enforce against the republic of Djibouti via cash held in UK banks. A third party company objected to the enforcement on the basis that the cash belonged to the company and not to the republic. It then sought security for costs against Soprim under CPR 25.
Waksman J held that under CPR 25.26, security for costs can only be ordered in favour of a defendant to a claim. Since the company was merely an objector to the enforcement proceedings, no order could be made under the rule and the application was dismissed.
The judgment can be found by clicking here.
Attersley v UK Insurance Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 217 – 4 March
Lewison Falk and Miles LJJ.
In proceedings for damages for personal injury, the issue was whether the claimant was limited to fixed costs, or entitled to costs assessed on the standard basis, up to the point of the expiry of the relevant period for acceptance of a Part 36 offer which she had accepted late.
The claim had started under the Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents (£1,000–£25,000) (“the RTA Protocol”). It had exited the RTA Protocol since liability was in dispute. Before allocation to a track, the Defendant had offered £45,000. Later, the claim was allocated to multi-track. After that, the claimant accepted the offer out of time.
Below (see [2025] Costs LR 615), Stacey J held that the claimant was entitled to costs on the standard basis up to the expiry of the Part 36 offer in accordance with CPR 45.29 then in force.
That decision was wrong.
Where a claim started under the Protocol and was later allocated to the multitrack due to late acceptance of an offer, the costs were governed by CPR 36.20 and the claimant was entitled only to the fixed costs. CPR 36.20 required the application of the fixed costs rules in Part 45 applicable on the date on which the relevant period expired in any case which had not, by that date, already been allocated to the multi-track.
Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.
The judgment can be found by clicking here.
Cooper & Powell v Ludgate House Ltd [2026] EWHC 484 (Ch) – 5 March
At trial, Fancourt J found in favour of the Claimants but refused, on a discretionary basis, to grant injunctive relief in relation to the rights to light they enjoyed appurtenant to their flats over the Defendant’s development site. He granted damages in lieu, on a negotiating damages basis, assessed at £350,000 for Mr Cooper and £500,000 for Mr and Mrs Powell.
The Claimants therefore succeeded on two primary elements of their claims, to establish the Defendant’s liability and entitlement to more substantial sums by way of damages, but failed to obtain the relief that they primarily sought.
The issue for the judge was who should pay the costs in these circumstances. He held that Mr and Mrs Powell had comfortably beaten an offer they made in November 2024 offer, but did not succeed in preserving their light and so were not successful on the whole of their claim.
Accordingly, they were awarded two thirds of their costs. For Mr Cooper, he had been offered £500,000 for his claim and to release his rights to light, and was awarded £350,000 in damages, which, with interest amounted to £385,105.67.
He therefore failed to beat the November 2024 offer unless his rights to light were worth about £115,000. The Court could not speculate a about the value of the rights to light, nor assume that they were worth £115,000. It followed that the judge could not conclude that that the Defendant has beaten its own offer, which nevertheless, was on any view, a reasonable offer to make.
The defendant was therefore ordered to pay just one third of Mr Cooper’s costs.
The judgment can be found by clicking here.
M (a Child) Costs Re [2026] EWCA Civ 381 – 27 March
Peter Jackson LJ, Sir Launcelot Henderson.
Below, the judge on appeal from a panel of two lay magistrates in private law proceedings under the Children Act 1989 (“CA”), had ordered the appellant father to pay the respondent mother’s costs of the appeal from the magistrates which she summarily assessed in the sum of £32,723.50 plus VAT.
Those proceedings concerned the young son of the father and the mother in relation to a final child arrangements order.
That decision had been wrong.
In family proceedings, the Family Procedure Rules 2010 r.28.2 disapplied the general rule in CPR r.44.2(2) that the unsuccessful party would be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party. Instead, r.28.1 simply allowed the court to make such order as to costs as it thought just.
Here, the judge had directed herself correctly on the law, but had erred in principle in distinguishing between the costs of the first instance hearing before the magistrates and the costs of the appeal.
There had been no reprehensible or unreasonable conduct in relation to the proceedings. It followed that the appeal was allowed, with the costs order being discharged and replaced with no order as to costs.
The judgment can be found by clicking here.
Atuanya v Ministry of Defence [2026] EWHC 758 (KB) – 30 March – Rory Dunlop KC
In an action which the Claimant had discontinued under CPR 38, it was the Defendant’s case that he had been fundamentally dishonest and should lose the benefit of costs protection under the scheme of Qualified One Way Costs Shifting (“QOCS”) applying in personal injury claims (see CPR 44.13-44.17).
That submission was advanced on the basis that the defendant was “plagued” by claims for damages for a non-freezing cold injury (“NFCI”) sustained while serving in the Army.
On the facts, that submission was accepted and fundamentally dishonesty proved, and a costs order was made against the Claimant.
The judgment can be found by clicking here.
Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2026] EWCA Civ 369 – 31 March – Vos Mr, Birss, Andrews LJJ.
Reversing the decision below (see [2026] Costs LR 2007) in which Sheldon J held that unauthorised persons could only support and assist qualified persons in the conduct of litigation, the Court of Appeal held that unauthorised person could lawfully perform any tasks which were within the scope of the conduct of litigation, for and on behalf of an authorised individual such as a solicitor or appropriately authorised CILEX member.
The authorised individual retained responsibility for the tasks delegated to the unauthorised person. The authorised individual was, therefore, the person carrying on the conduct of litigation.
The unauthorised person was not carrying on the conduct of litigation and did not commit an offence under s.14 Legal Services Act 2007. However, the delegation of tasks by the authorised individual to the unauthorised person required proper management supervision and control. The question in any given set of circumstances would be whether the unauthorised person, in carrying out whatever tasks which fell within the scope of “conduct of litigation” had been delegated to him or her, was in truth acting on behalf of the authorised individual. If they were, it was the authorised individual who was conducting the litigation. But if the reality was that the litigation was not being conducted by the unauthorised person for and on behalf of the authorised individual, they would be committing an offence.
The judgment can be found by clicking here
