Costs Case Law Update – April 2026
Welcome to the Kain Knight Case Law Update for April 2026, written by Colin Campbell.
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Turk v Legal Aid Agency [2026] EWCA Civ 469 Bean LJ; Jeremy Baker LJ; Zacaroli LJ – 17 Apr 2026.
The question for the Court of Appeal was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to make a “Recovery of Defence Costs Order” (“RDCO”) under the Criminal Legal Aid (Recovery of Defence Costs Orders) Regulations 2013 (the “Recovery Regulations”),against the appellant (“Mr Turk”), who was the defendant to contempt proceedings. Mr Turk was the subject of a freezing order, which imposed on him a number of disclosure obligations. The claimant in the underlying proceedings, Mrs İşbilen, had brought committal proceedings against Mr Turk, alleging a breach of those disclosure obligations.
Mr Turk had been found to be in contempt of court and sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment. He had obtained criminal legal aid in the committal proceedings, despite the civil nature of those proceedings. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the Legal Aid Agency (“LAA”) sought an RDCO. The judge determined that the court had jurisdiction to make an RDCO and ordered Mr Turk to pay to the LAA the whole of the costs of his representation before the High Court, amounting to £392,823.70.
On appeal, it was Mr Turk’s submission that that the judge erred in finding that “criminal proceedings before any court other than the magistrates’ court or the Crown Court” in Regulation 2 included civil contempt proceedings. That submission failed. The term “criminal proceedings” in regulation 2 included civil contempt proceedings. Neither the alleged anomalies in the treatment of acquitted defendants, nor the historical context of recovery of defence costs orders, provided a sufficient contrary intention to displace that plain meaning.
It was perfectly coherent that someone accused of contempt of court in High Court proceedings, and facing the possibility of a prison sentence of up to two years, was able to access funding at the outset to defend themselves, but on terms that they must repay it, to the extent that they can afford to do so, at the end of the proceedings, leaving them, if successful, to seek to recover their costs from the unsuccessful applicant. Appeal dismissed.
The judgment can be found by clicking here.
David Alexander de Horner Rowntree v (1) the Performing Right Society Limited and (2) PRS For Music Limited [2026] CAT 25 – 16 March
On 27 August 2025, Justin Turner KC refused to grant Mr Rowntree (the PCR) a collective proceedings order and struck out the claim on the principal ground that members of the class were not owed royalties and that consequently they did not have individual claims against the Defendants, (PRS).
In dealing with costs, he ordered that these be paid by the PCR to the PRS on the standard basis. The PRS sought £2.6m, but accepted that there was sufficient material before the Tribunal upon which to reach a summary determination. In carrying out a summary assessment, the judge found that the hourly rates charged were significantly above the 2025 Solicitors’ Guideline Hourly Rates and there was no particular complexity in the case which justified an uplift. That reduced the costs to £2m.
A large number of solicitors were involved: four partners working on the case and eight non-partner solicitors. Ten fee earners charged more than £500 an hour. The costs were extraordinarily high. The successful arguments presented by the PRS, on were straightforward and did not require expenditure of the amounts being claimed. A robust view and a broad axe were appropriate: taking into consideration the scope and complexity of the arguments, the costs were assessed at £750,000 plus VAT.
The judgment can be found by clicking here.
Mehta v Howard Kennedy LLP [2026[ EWHC 968 (KB) – 24 April
When acting for the claimant in proceedings involving a worldwide freezing order, the defendants had delivered 24 invoices to him from 22nd June 2022 to 5th May 2023 with a total value of £3,124,674.04. If the invoices were interim statutory bills which were subject to the time limits in s.70 Solicitors Act 1974, they could not be referred to the court for assessment. Below, the court had held that (1) the invoices were statutory and did not comprise a series of interim invoices delivered as part of a bill which became ‘final’ with the delivery of the last invoice, so no assessment could be ordered (2) that the retainer was not a Contentious Business Agreement (‘CBA’) within the meaning of ss59 to 63 of the 1974 Act and (3) the invoices were ‘paid’ within the meaning of the Act and the Claimant could not demonstrate ‘special circumstances’ pursuant to s70(3), such that it would be just to order an assessment.
In respect of (1) and (3) Kimblin J held that those decisions were correct. The key factors in respect of (1) were that the Terms of Business stated clearly that (i) “each bill issued to you is a final bill covering the total charge for the work carried out within the stated period”, that (ii) “each bill has the status of a statute bill”, unless otherwise stated and (iii) referred to the solicitor’s right to sue.
As to (3) there was nothing irregular or ineffective in payments being made by a third or non-chargeable party, so long as that happened with the knowledge and consent of the client, which it had. No special circumstances existed because the Claimant had received regular, itemised invoices with detailed accounts of the work done and so understood his ongoing liability, and he had paid almost 80% of the invoices. Issue (2) : consideration was stayed pending the outcome of an appeal to be heard by the Court of Appeal which had strongly overlapping issues.
The judgment can be found by clicking here.
O’Boyle v Wallis [2026] EWHC 951 (Ch) – 28 April
In proceedings brought by her father in which his daughter after his death had been appointed under CPR 19.12 as representative of his estate, the issue for Andrew Twigger KC to decide was whether she should be liable to pay costs on the indemnity basis following the action being struck out, including those before her appointment. The judge held that her role had been unaffected by her subsequent bankruptcy and that there was locus standi to bring an appeal against the decision below ordering her to pay all the Defendant’s cost. However, in going so, the court had made an error of principle in having equated representative appointed pursuant to CPR 19.12 with a Personal Representative, thereby regarding the daughter as personally liable for whatever costs were payable by the estate, as a matter of law.
It followed that it did not accord with the overriding objective for her to be held personally liable for costs prior to her appointment to represent the estate in the proceedings on 14 March 2025. She was in no way the cause of those costs and nothing she said or did when applying to be appointed could reasonably be interpreted as accepting the risk of being ordered to pay the estate’s costs up to that date until 18 July 2025.
Thereafter the costs would be paid by her on the standard basis as her conduct of the proceedings between those dates was not unreasonable to the high degree required to take her conduct outside the “norm”.
The judgment can be found by clicking here.
